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ABSTRACT. Here, I consider how social-ecological resilience can be facilitated by the use of property rights. Taking a legal
perspective on the use of different forms of property, I consider how property rules can manifest the attributes of flexibility,
responsiveness, optionality, and scalability associated with resilient systems. I note how different regulatory regimes such as
domestic law and international law have differing capacities to accommodate property rights, and this in turn affects the capability
of property to sustain resilience. The fluid nature of resilience and property systems defies simple conclusions about the influence
of property rights on resilience. However, it is possible to make some general observations on how well-suited archetype forms
of property such as private property and community-based holdings might be for regulating certain resources.
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INTRODUCTION
How best to manage dwindling, endangered, or finite
resources in light of societies’ expanding and changing
demands is one the most important and difficult tasks facing
us today. Because property rights define relationships between
people in respect of things, and almost all things are subject
to some form of property, the regulation of property has a
fundamental role to play in the management of the world’s
resources. Viewed instrumentally, law is a tool for creating,
defining, allocating, managing, and protecting property rights;
it establishes rules and frameworks for deciding how to use
things, including environmental goods and services. Although
much has been written on the justification and operation of
property rights, the literature remains underdeveloped in
respect to developments in our understanding of
environmental goods and services and complex phenomena
such as ecosystems and biological diversity. In the last few
decades, resilience scholarship has begun to provide new ways
of thinking about the relationship between ecological systems
and social systems, not as discreet systems, but as interlinked,
symbiotic systems (Folke 2006). Recently, tentative steps
have been taken to explore how thinking about resilience can
be applied to thinking about law. Tarlock (1994) in particular
has challenged how law can adapt to the idea of a
nonequilibrium paradigm in which natural systems evolve
continuously. 
Here, I aim to contribute to the discussions about law and
resilience by mapping out the relationship between social-
ecological resilience and the operation of property rights over
natural resources. First, I consider the nature and scope of
resilience scholarship. The aim is to draw out some of the key
concepts that define resilience and that can be accommodated
in legal institutions. Second, I make some observations on how
law in general can facilitate resilience. Because law defines
property rights, certain characteristics of law and legal
reasoning, as well as the operation of legal institutions, will
determine how property rights can facilitate social-ecological
resilience. Of particular importance is the capacity of law
(domestic, regional, and international) to manage property
rights at different spatial scales. This is important because
many social-ecological systems transcend individual States
and domestic property regimes. Finally, I outline the structure
and operation of property rights, focusing particularly on
private property, and consider the extent to which property
rights can either accommodate or impede social-ecological
resilience. I argue that the rich diversity of property rights
renders it a highly flexible institution, seemingly well-suited
to facilitating social-ecological resilience, at least at local
scales.
SOME REFLECTIONS ON RESILIENCE
The idea of resilience was developed by Holling (1973) as a
way of explaining how natural systems tolerate stress and
retain their basic functioning. Initially focusing on localized
relations between species and habitats, prey and predator, the
early approaches have since been refined, developed, and
applied to more complex, larger-scale ecosystems. In a state
of the literature review, Folke (2006) notes how the resilience
perspective has since influenced social science research,
especially in the fields of economics, human geography, and
management. Recently, resilience thinking has started to
permeate into legal scholarship and influence how we can
understand the design of legal institutions (Ebbesson 2010). 
Four concepts are central to understanding resilience: identity
(or state), persistence, adaptation, and transformability.
Identity comprises the variables that constitute the system. For
example, a fish stock is measured in terms of its biomass within
a particular marine space. A legal system may be defined by
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the rules, procedures, and institutions within a given
jurisdiction. A system is persistent if it is able to withstand
pressures and change. For example, a fish stock may respond
to high levels of predation by increased spawning levels. A
legal system’s persistence might be measured in terms of its
capacity to withstand internal legal challenge or external
pressure for reform. The response to change or pressure
describes the system’s capacity to adapt. This is invariably
quite contextual. Continuing with the example of a fish stock,
its capacity to recover from overfishing will depend on a range
of variables, including the size of the stock, species
characteristics, availability of food and habitats, and
competition from other species. Other variables such as the
level of pollution, water temperature, and salinity may also
come into play. It should be noted that the adaption of social
systems tends to be the result of deliberative social processes.
Thus, a legal system can adapt through legislative reform and
dispute resolution. Transformability refers to the capacity of
a system to change into a fundamentally new system when
social, economic, political, or ecological conditions make the
old system untenable (Walker et al. 2004). Transformation
may occur naturally or it may be forced by changed
environmental and/or social conditions. For example,
transformation might include the designation of areas of ocean
space as an offshore wind farm in place of fishing grounds,
thereby prioritizing energy generation and potential habitat
protection over fisheries. An apposite example of
transformation of a social/legal system was the collapse of
communist regimes in Europe and the emergence of market-
based systems favoring the use of private property rights-based
approaches, rather than State-based command and control
regulation. 
Much research into resilience has focused on developing our
understanding of what makes a system resilient, designing and
understanding adaptation strategies, and evaluating the
possibilities of and mechanisms for transforming systems.
Initially, two approaches were dominant in the literature:
engineering resilience and ecological resilience (Holling
1996). Engineering resilience focuses on keeping a system
near a stable equilibrium or return to the equilibrium following
a disturbance. It favors efficiency, constancy, and
predictability in the design of systems. However, although this
approach may well work in linear systems, it seems ill-suited
to the complexity and unpredictability of systems in the real
world, as the fisheries example described above shows. In
contrast, ecological resilience is concerned with “the
magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the
system changes its structure by changing the variables and
processes that control behavior” (Gunderson and Holling
2002:28). More recently, appreciation of the complex
interactions between natural and social systems has challenged
us to think about the resilience of social-ecological systems
rather than discreet natural and social systems. The point to
note is that there are various strategies available to achieve
resilience, with increased focus on system complexity. 
Resilience commits us to dealing with complex systems, and
this presents many challenges. Social-ecological systems in
particular are characterized by complexity and nonlinear
dynamics. This means we need to have regimes with the
capacity to deal with uncertainty and surprise. We also know
that the resilience of a system may depend on interactions and
influences at different spatial scales. For example, changes in
global climate can affect the ocean’s salinity, which may have
an effect on the dynamics of fish stocks and hence fishing
patterns (Roessig et al. 2004). This requires an understanding
of natural and social systems at multiple scales and further
complicates the management of social-ecological systems.
Both natural and social systems can withstand different kinds
of pressure and respond in different ways, and may be
predisposed to certain types of resilience and to certain types
of management. We need to be able to evaluate which
management strategies are best suited to each system. Because
each system possesses different qualities and attracts different
management objectives, it would seem that the use of
resilience strategies will be highly contextual. Hence,
resilience should not be regarded as an absolute constraint on
action. Moreover, it is essential to recall that although
ecosystems may be natural phenomena, they are still
conceptualized by humans. This means that the parameters of
any given system will be influenced by human values or
preconceptions about how things work. This contingency may
be a consequence of limits in knowledge, but is also the product
of value-laden structures of knowledge. As already indicated,
the selection of resilience strategies will often depend on what
goals are perceived as socially desirable. Thus, high
productive food capacity from agricultural land may be
preferable to a high variety of food production so as to secure
sufficiency of food supplies. In more abstract terms, do we
desire more controlled systems at the risk of flexibility? There
is no simple answer to this question; ultimately, resilience
appears not to be a panacea. Rather, it provides useful ways
of understanding how systems work, and this in turn helps us
make choices about how we should manage these systems. 
Although the foregoing presents a somewhat daunting set of
challenges, there are some useful lessons that we can take
forward into an analysis of property rights. Fundamentally,
resilience is a knowledge-based approach. Knowledge
underpins our understanding of the state of a system and its
persistence. It also shapes adaption and transformability
strategies. Although knowledge is often contingent or
incomplete, because it underpins decision-making, resilience
strategies should seek to enhance the production of
knowledge. The capacity to generate and harness knowledge
implies the existence of suitable social structures for managing
systems. This is reinforced by the fact that adaption and
transformation is generally accommodated through social
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intervention. This requires institutions with the capacity to
define problems; determine goals and objectives for the
management of a system; determine system parameters and
baselines; develop conceptual models; select future
restoration actions; implement and manage actions,
monitoring systems, and responses; and evaluate activities
(Ruhl 2011). If resilience is to be managed, then any decision-
making process must possess a number of other attributes.
First, because adaptation and transformation will be affected
by the underlying quality of knowledge about a social-
ecological system, effective lines of communication and use
of knowledge between stakeholders and management agencies
may improve decision-making. Second, both adaptation and
transformation require a management regime to be flexible to
allow managers to respond to changes in a social-ecological
system. Systems must be flexible, but within limits, because
a high degree of flexibility may result in uncertainty and
thereby undermine the ability of people to plan their conduct.
Of course, adaption to change or transformation depends upon
the possibility of change. The availability of management
options will depend on the characteristics of a system, the
creativity of management agencies, and management
priorities. For example, a precarious system may have fewer
options for recovery than a more stable system. Generally, a
more resilient system will maintain more options for change
or transformation. Thus, the third quality of resilient
management is optionality. However, such a system will be
more difficult to manage than a simple system with limited
variables of change. This suggests that optionality will be
limited by what is practical. Flexibility is also related to a
fourth requirement of resilient management: responsiveness.
A more adaptive system will generally be one that is
responsive and able to implement measures more quickly.
Whereas flexibility describes the capacity for change,
responsiveness is a measure of the speed of change. Fifth,
resilient management should ensure that decision makers have
sufficient competence to adopt decision. This should include
scope for autonomous decision-making because strongly
hierarchical or complex procedures may impede decision-
making by slowing down the speed of responses. Finally, given
that the resilience of a system can be affected by changes at
different scales, a management regime should be capable of
operating a multiple scales so that account can be taken of
changes systems at higher and lower levels. 
In brief, we can analyze the capacity of property rights to
accommodate resilience in terms of property’s capacity to
generate and harness knowledge, as well as the extent to which
the rules governing property are flexible, responsive, maintain
future options, and allow for regulation at appropriate scales.
LAW AND RESILIENCE
Because property rights are mediated through law, it is
necessary to consider briefly the relationship between law and
resilience because the inherent qualities of legal rules will
necessarily influence the extent to which property rights can
accommodate resilience. For example, open-textured rules or
principles may provide greater scope for adapting to change
than precise rules (Ebbesson 2010). I begin by considering
how resilience can influence law, before noting how the
general attributes of law as a concept appear well-suited to
accommodating the features of resilience. However, the extent
to which this is possible seems highly contingent upon the
attributes of any given legal system’s institutional structures
and processes. 
Resilience is both an analytical device and a normative value.
It can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of law’s capacity
to regulate social and natural systems, and it can be part of the
design goals for a legal system, set of legal institutions, or even
rules. In both cases, this is no straightforward matter because,
as noted above, resilience is not a singular approach. It is highly
complex, contextual, and knowledge dependent, meaning that
it does not provide an easy measure of the quality of a system,
nor is it certain the meaning or weight to be afforded to
resilience in any given system. It must be weighed against
other values that legal systems seek to advance. For example,
property rights are typically justified according to a range of
values, including labor/desert, liberty, utility, efficiency, and
propriety (Barnes 2009). Such values help determine whether
any given form and allocation of property is desirable. There
would appear to be space to include resilience alongside such
well-established values. However, we must be cautious.
Although resilience may be a quality of a social system, it does
not necessarily make the system good (Ruhl 2011). Thus, a
dictatorship may be a resilient form of government, but it is
unlikely to be regarded as a good thing. On the other hand, the
resilience of a legal system may provide a degree of certainty
and hence the basis for security of expectations. In the same
way that liberty or justice might be measures or goals of a legal
system, we need to develop the meaning and content of
resilience. 
If law is to facilitate resilient social-ecological systems, then
it ought to be able to display and nurture the attributes of
resilience and adaptation. It should be flexible, responsive,
and knowledge driven, maintain options, and possess effective
governance mechanisms. In large part, the first four
requirements can be accommodated by law because of its
dynamic nature. 
All legal systems comprise a complex mix of regulatory
approaches: legislation and case law, procedural rules and
substantive rules, formal laws and informal customs, broad
guiding principles and particular rules. These are often
combined with nonlegal mechanisms (e.g., economic policies
and financial incentives) for achieving particular social goals.
The choice of regulatory tool largely depends on the perceived
optimal social outcome, but it should also suit the nature of
the social-ecological system (Gunningham and Sinclair 2005).
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Certain regulatory approaches are better suited to certain
resilience strategies. For example, at a general level, it may
be observed that principles with their open, flexible
application may be better suited to ecological resilience
strategies, whereas rules of specific application may be better
suited to engineering resilience. The point here is not to
advocate in particular form of regulatory tool, but rather to
note that most legal systems prefer a pluralist approach to
regulation and retain a toolkit of measures to be used as
appropriate. In short, most legal systems accommodate a range
of regulatory options. 
It is generally accepted that the process of legal reasoning,
which helps determine the application of specific rules in
specific contexts, requires legal assertions to possess certain
attributes that make them compelling (Alexy 1989). Legal
rules will stand or fall depending on both the context of the
rule and the quality of the reasoning that underpins it. This
requires rules to be reasonable and coherent and sensitive to
legal and behavioral consequences (MacCormick 2005). The
process of reasoning sustains a tension between certainty and
flexibility and is central to the nature of law. Crucially, legal
reasoning does not happen in the abstract, it happens within
specific contexts. In this sense, law is open to development, it
can accommodate a range of scenarios, and it is driven by
reasoning processes that are predisposed to the harnessing of
knowledge. 
Law is an inherently iterative process that works through a
tension between determinacy and adaptability (Ebbesson
2010). Although it is desirable that law is systematic and
ordered, no legal system is complete and unchanging. Indeed,
experience shows that absolute rules are but a short step from
totalitarianism. Thus, it is a good thing for laws, rules, and
principles to be constantly tested and exposed to critical
scrutiny through public debate and legal challenge. When the
values that underpin the law change, then the law must adapt.
Moreover, rules do not cover every eventuality, and even if
we could exercise divine foresight to regulate for all
contingencies, then the indeterminacy of language presents
yet another barrier to our desires for prescriptive certainty.
Together, these factors cause law to possess a defeasible
character. Defeasibility refers to a quality of rules that entails
their defeat or qualification under certain conditions (Tur
2001). This generally happens when overriding reasons for
not applying the normal rule arise. Defeasibility allows for the
sequential development of basic propositions into far more
complex rule structures. Through the iteration and recognition
of qualifications or exceptions, law is capable of being
calibrated to the complex realities of everyday life. This shows
the propensity for legal rules to be both flexible and
responsive. 
Although law retains the potential to sustain the first four
requirements of resilience, its capacity to do so may be
enhanced or limited by the effectiveness of the institutions
through which it operates. Institutions include formal bodies
and structures such as legislatures and courts (institutional
agencies), as well as arrangements and practices such as
property. How then do the institutional capacities of different
legal systems affect resilience? When referring to legal
systems, we are not merely concerned with domestic law,
despite the critical role it plays in regulating property rights.
We are also concerned with regional regimes such as European
Union (EU) law and international law. Social-ecological
systems range from highly localized systems such as a farm
or forest to global systems such as the atmosphere. Whereas
localized social-ecological systems can often be accommodated
exclusively within domestic legal regimes for regulatory and
management purposes, many social-ecological systems
extend beyond the limits of domestic jurisdiction. Because
large-scale social-ecological systems cannot be regulated
entirely under individual domestic legal systems (and
sometimes regional systems, like EU law), international law
plays a role in setting standards and harnessing cooperation
between States. Accordingly, we must be aware of both the
institutional qualities of these discreet legal systems and how
they relate to each other because this can influence resilience
and the operation of property rights. Institutional failings or
structures can have consequences for the designation of
control over resources and hence resilience. One well-
observed phenomenon is corruption, broadly understood as
the misuse of public power for private gain. It can distort
normal social interactions, embedding privileged and
disadvantaged social structures, thereby undermining good
governance. It may adversely affect resource protection by
dislocating certain resources from formal protection or
selectively exploiting vulnerable resources (Robbins 2000,
Sundström 2012). 
Both EU and domestic law possess strong vertically structured
legal institutions capable of prescribing and enforcing legal
rules. The existence of regularized legislative procedures and
exclusive dispute settlement mechanisms points toward their
capacity to engineer resilience by the creation of precise and
binding rules. However, this is not necessarily at the expense
of more ecological resilience strategies. Most legal systems,
but particularly common law traditions, possess the capacity
to respond to diverse situations through the courts. This can
be done without fundamentally changing the structure of a
system. For example, Ruhl (2011) notes how the law of
nuisance, which concerns unlawful interference in others’
enjoyment of their property rights, has adapted without
compromising its basic principles or function in the legal
system. 
In contrast, international law is a horizontally structured legal
regime based on the formal equality of States. It proceeds
largely upon the basis of consent or consensus through a
decentralized law creation processes and is principally
Ecology and Society 18(1): 6
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol18/iss1/art6/
concerned with the rights and duties of States. The absence of
strong institutions makes it difficult for international law to
establish tightly controlled regimes. Moreover, the emphasis
on consent means that it tends to result in more open-textured
or framework-type rules. This seems to predispose it toward
ecological-type resilience strategies. To the extent that
individuals are both part of the law creation process and subject
to directly enforceable rights and duties, one expects domestic
law, and to a lesser extent EU law, to be more socially
responsive than international law. This is reinforced by the
time it takes to produce law in these systems. The duration of
domestic and EU legislative process is measured in terms of
months and years, unlike international law, which is often
measured in decades. Furthermore, most domestic legal
systems have the capacity to adopt emergency or provisional
measures to deal with unforeseen contingencies. The greater
frequency of opportunities for the design, application, and
testing of legal rules at local levels has produced much more
carefully calibrated legal regimes. Accordingly, domestic and
EU law retain a higher degree of sensitivity to shocks and
change within the system. This means that projects aimed at
the systemic integration of social and ecological systems are
much further advanced than under international law. Examples
include the EU Marine Strategy Framework Directive
(MSFD) and the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 of
England and Wales (MCAA). The MSFD aims to achieve
“good environmental status” (GES) for European seas by
2020; to this end, Annex I contains a list of descriptors of GES
that encompass both natural and social values. The MCCA
requires the Marine Management Organisation to contribute
to the development of sustainable development. More
specifically, it requires a system of regionally based marine
planning. This will structure the way in which a range of
activities take place, both spatially and temporally in coastal
waters, as well as facilitate the transboundary regulation of
such activities. Both regimes are strongly reliant on a scientific
knowledge base and advance flexible monitoring programmes
capable of accommodating a wide range of marine conditions
and activities at multiple scales. Moreover, both are being
developed with a high degree of stakeholder engagement. The
participatory and integrated processes inherent in these
regimes renders them better suited to identifying and
responding to changing social and natural conditions. 
These regimes do not operate in isolation from international
marine regulatory regimes, and there is some overlap here with
the role of OSPAR, the regime for the protection of the marine
environment of the North East Atlantic. OSPAR has done
important work on the development of regulatory standards,
including “ecological quality objectives” (EcoQOs). These are
expressions of the structure and function of a system, including
those resulting from human activities. They are linked to
specific indicators and are used to establish management
measures. This explicitly incorporates an ecosystem approach.
Interestingly, OSPAR regulations and monitoring systems
will underpin some of the measures adopted under the MFSD
or MCAA. This presents a more complex picture of how
resilient domestic and international systems operate because
they influence each other. However, from a formal legal point
of view, it should be noted that OSPAR does not directly
regulate individual conduct and hence property rights. In a UK
context, OSPAR measures must be transposed through
domestic law before they have effect. Also, although some of
OSPAR’s EcoQOs encompass natural resources, OSPAR’s
remit is more limited to pollution and protection of the marine
environment. This means it cannot formally address key issues
such as fisheries regulation, and so provides a less complete
approach to the regulation of social-ecological systems. 
Despite operating at different levels, domestic, EU, and
international law are not isolated legal systems. Here is not
the place to explore in detail the relationship between these
legal orders. However, it is useful to provide some brief
remarks on how different legal systems (domestic law, EU
law, and international law) can shape property systems. It is
important to appreciate that these mechanisms exist, because
they provide the means for ensuring that impacts on and
changes in social-ecological systems at global scales can feed
into the regulation of systems at local levels. One general
observation is that there may be a gap between the formal
operation of legal institutional and actual practice. For
example, States may have formal authority to regulate coastal
fisheries, hence removing them from the common pool.
However, if the State lacks the financial or institutional
capacity to implement laws, then the fishery remains de facto
open access. 
As noted above, property is a private law institution, meaning
that property rules will be located almost exclusively within
domestic legal systems. There are perhaps four principal
exceptions to the domesticity of private law institutions. First,
certain substantive principles of international law are directly
concerned with ensuring the proper use of natural resources,
and this entails restrictions on the use of property within
domestic law. Thus, States are required to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction do not cause harm outside their
territories. There are also duties of notification and
consultation, and commitments to carry out environmental
impact assessments. Such duties require limits to be applied
to private property rights under domestic law. Second, because
certain areas remain beyond the exclusive jurisdiction of
States, international law plays a primary role in regulating the
activities of private persons in such international areas. Unless
domestic legal regimes are extended to such areas or the
resource therein, and this seems politically unlikely, then the
only other option is for international law to establish rules
applicable to private persons in such spaces. For example, the
deep seabed has been designated the common heritage of
mankind, a regime akin to common property with reasonably
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detailed rules on access to and use of mineral resources. The
designation under international law of property rights over
other resources such as fisheries is not straightforward and
remains an emerging field of research (Barnes 2010). Third,
international human rights law demands that property rules
are compatible with fundamental human rights considerations,
including the protection of the environment. Both domestic
courts and international courts such as the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights have sought to ensure that the use of property
is consistent with basic human rights, including the protection
of the environment (Barnes 2009). For example, in Hamer vs.
Belgium, the ECHR reaffirmed Belgium’s right to demolish a
house built on forestry land in breach of Belgian law designed
to protect the environment, and the owner was required by the
state to restitute the land to its previous state. The ECHR
upheld the legality of Belgium’s action, despite the impact on
upon property rights. This protection of human rights is
particularly important in the context of indigenous rights,
where control of property may be vested in communities and
is often associated with a strong ethic of environmental
responsibility (Gilbert 2006). Thus, in Mayagna (Sumo) Awas
Tingni Community vs. Nicaragua, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights upheld a claim against
Nicaragua for failing to protect communal land rights of an
indigenous group by granting commercial logging
concessions to private companies. Fourth, international
investment law has begun to develop rules concerning the fair
and equitable treatment of investments and hence property
rights (Montt 2009). Although the precise level and standards
of control on property rights through investment law is very
much a live debate, it remains a relevant consideration. 
To summarize, because law shapes property, the resilience of
law will influence the resilience of property rights. The
institutional qualities of international, EU, and domestic law
affect the precise way in which law can accommodate
resilience. Because international law operates at a global scale,
it is better suited to dealing with the regulation of
transboundary social-ecological systems such as the marine
environment. It is highly flexible and adopts a wide variety of
regulatory strategies to address social and environmental
needs. However, because international law is concerned
primarily with the rights and duties of States, it is generally
ill-suited to the direct regulation of property. It may, however,
exert indirect influence on the construction of property rights
through its rules and principles governing the use of natural
resources. Domestic law and EU law are more formalized and
capable of developing precise and tightly controlled legal
regimes. However, they also maintain a wide variety of
regulatory strategies to deal with environmental issues. Given
that domestic law directly sustains the institution of property,
its governance structures will be of primary importance in
facilitating social-ecological resilience strategies within
property law.
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESILIENCE
In law, property rights concern the legal relationship between
people in respect of things. A property right entitles the right
holder to make a claim on an act or forbearance of another
party in respect of a thing. This right has the force of domestic
law behind it. Domestic law also ensures that the holders
exercise their rights in accordance with any legal limits
imposed upon the right. Property is not a monolithic concept.
Neither does property operate in the same way in all domestic
legal systems. The construction and operation of property
rights is highly contextual, being the product a complex
interplay of social, economic, and moral values over the course
of history (Barnes 2009). However, some general, if somewhat
abstract, observations can be made about the nature of
property. It may be broken down into component legal
relationships, including possession, use, management, income
rights, transmissibility, security rights, as well as duties such
as nonharmful use (Honoré 1961). The ability of law to vary
the quality of these incidents of ownership, and to allocate
them among different persons, means that property in general
is a highly flexible institution and, in principle, can sustain
resilience strategies. However, I should also note that central
to property is the idea of excludability, that is, the right to
exclude others from a thing and determine how a thing should
be used. Accordingly, the designation of property rights turns
on whether or not something can be subject to exclusion. It is
notable that many important resources remain outside
institutions of property or subject to particular forms of
property because they cannot be made excludable (Barnes
2009). This indicates limits to the extent that property or
certain forms of property can compose part of a toolkit of
techniques to facilitate resilience. 
Traditionally, the objects of property rights have tended to be
individual things that can be physically ascertained and/or
commodified. As a result, the idea that natural resources
constitute some discreet system or form part of a
socioeconomic system has not featured in the design of
property rights until recently. Of course, land holdings might
encompass a socioeconomic system, but this has been
somewhat incidental to the designation of land ownership.
Rather, socioeconomic factors such as feudalism, farming and
land-use schemes, and inheritance have been determinative of
both the extent and allocation of holdings. Accordingly, the
boundaries and content of land ownership rights have been
drawn regardless of how they cut across natural systems. 
However, in the last few decades, there has been increasing
concern with the alignment of property rights and natural
systems. This tends to operate through external constraints on
property because it is difficult to accommodate positive
environmental duties within existing rights. Planning regimes
are increasingly focused on the consequences of developments
on the wider environment. For example, British planning law
requires development decisions to be made in accordance with
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a planning authority’s development plan. This plan must be
drawn up in accordance with national planning policy, which
establishes a presumption in favor of sustainable development
and specifically requires that certain environmental
considerations form part of the development control process
(Department for Communities and Local Government 2012).
The effect of this is to subject property rights (such as an
owner’s right to build on land) to control, in light of the wider
impacts of such a development on the environment. This
proactively and prospectively shapes the way in which
property and land can be used. Similarly, Article 10 of the EU
Habitats Directive requires Member States to “endeavour,
where they consider it necessary, in their land-use planning
and development policies and, in particular, with a view to
improving the ecological coherence of the Natura 2000
network, to encourage the management of features of the
landscape which are of major importance for wild fauna and
flora.” Although phased in hortatory terms, the requirement
has been implemented under British law in more demanding
terms by Regulation 39 of the Habitats Regulations 2010. This
defines policies relating to land use and development under
planning legislation as including policies for the protection of
habitats, thereby making habitat considerations a central part
of statutory planning control. This requires consideration not
merely of designated protected sites, but also of corridors and
other natural features that connect designated sites. 
Given this interest in aligning natural and social systems, how
then can property rights facilitate resilience? The answer to
this seems to depend, first, on how desirable a goal resilience
is for society, and second, on which form of property is used
to facilitate this goal. 
Although property is often regarded as a private right, it
provides an important public function (Barnes 2009). Property
is consciously designed to maintain a proper form of social
order. It is an institution of a community, and so first and
foremost, it is designed to meet certain core community values.
Typically, these include guaranteeing that basic human needs
can be met, and securing a basis for planning future activities.
This general point about community values and the public
function of property is crucial because it suggests that
community interests are as important as private interests when
it comes to defining individual property rights. This public or
social dimension of property helps explain why property rights
vary between different legal systems. For example, water
rights may vary considerably from country to country
(Hodgson 2006). Such differences also arise in respect of land,
mineral deposits, and forests (McHarg et al. 2010). It is no
surprise that such differences arise in the context of key natural
resources, given the strong public interest in their allocation
and use. 
Resilience seems to fit with the idea of a public good because
it is concerned with the desirability and durability of social-
ecological systems. If resilience is categorized as a public
good, or indeed a desirable form of order, then it can be used
to define the public limits or even private responsibilities of
property owners. Of course, this approach is predicated on
whether or not the resilience of certain natural or social
systems is “good”, and, as noted above, this may be
contentious. However, even if this point about the general
desirability of resilience is contested, a strong argument can
still be made that social-ecological facts remain a constraining
aspect of property. This is because property rights should be
drawn in line with the essential qualities of the thing to which
they apply. For example, riparian rights must acknowledge
the fluid nature of water and its interactions with the wider
environment. Such facts not only comprise physical limits of
things, but also alert us to the interconnectedness of the
individual components of a system such as the relationship
between prey and predator, and the nature of food chains. That
property comprises a series of legal relations between people
in respect of things should not disguise the fact that the physical
attributes of a resource are in many ways determinative of the
legal relations that govern its use. Thus, air is free of private
property because it would be both practically impossible to
bound it and morally objectionable to seek to exclude persons
from an essential good. In this sense, resilience, which
provides a framework for understanding natural and social
systems, is a device that demands and enables us to consider
closely the relationship between things and rules and to
account for the real world consequences of establishing
particular forms of property. 
Property regimes generally combine a number of types of
property, ranging from individual private property to forms of
collective holding. Indeed, the range of property holdings
varies incredibly, depending on how the various incidents of
ownership are designed and allocated. This reaffirms the
inherent flexibility of property and opens up possibilities for
quite varied and adaptable forms of property. The variable
attributes of property mean that it can provide quite different
levels of support for (or impediment to) social-ecological
resilience. It is not possible to survey every type of property,
so I consider some archetypes: private property and
community based holdings (CBHs). Before outlining these
two types, I want to make clear my position: no single type of
property is a panacea. There is much debate about whether
privatization is a solution for problems of environmental
degradation, particularly for global commons (Ostrom 1990).
However, it seems intuitive, given the wide range of and
quality of things and the complexities of social organization,
that there can be no one-size-fits-all solution. Experience and
the variety of property regimes we have in practice seem to
prove that a plurality of property structures is necessary. This
much is also consistent with the general requirement of
optionality, although, as noted below, the availability of
certain options may be limited because of social and legal
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pressures embedded within particular arrangements of private
property.
Private property
A system of private property vests rights of exclusive control
over a thing in the hands of a single person. Private property
is a widespread and enduring form of property and may be
regarded as socially resilient. In recent years, novel forms of
private property, like transferable environmental allowances
(TEA), have been developed to bring to bear some of the
positive attributes of property on environmental problems. A
TEA is created when the state establishes a cap on the quantity
of a resource that may be used. The available resource may
then be divided into individual allowances and shared out
among a limited group of “owners”, and other potential users
are excluded from the regime. The TEA may be bought, sold,
used, and otherwise treated like private property, at least to
the extent that the regulatory regime permits. It is the ability
of the regulatory regime to capture these attributes of private
property that make TEAs desirable management tools. Such
entitlements have been developed for a range of resource
regimes, including fisheries and emissions trading schemes,
suggesting that private property is a rather adaptable
institution. The question is, then, how far can private property
accommodate the attributes of social-ecological resilience
identified above: the generation of knowledge, flexibility,
responsiveness, optionality, and scalability associated with
resilience? 
We can begin by noting that private property seems designed
to secure the continued existence of the objects of property.
Most justifications for private property attach considerable
weight to the fact that the owner has a vested interest in
preserving the capital of his/her holding. Because the owner
of a thing enjoys all the benefits of a thing, assuming him/her
to be rational, he/she will not do something that diminishes its
value through destructive or wasteful use. Thus, we look after
our homes and cultivate our land, and most legal regimes have
developed duties of nonharmful use of property to reinforce
this. Here, there seems to be a natural alignment of private
property rights with some notion of persistence. However, this
is only part of the picture because resilience is about more than
maintaining the existence of individual things; it is about the
resilience of the social-ecological system. This presents some
particular challenges for private property. 
Because private property rights are generally individual claims
against the wider community and often the State, they require
strong institutional support under domestic law. As such,
private property is strongly tied to both the robustness of the
domestic legal system and the values that the legal system
embodies. This may result in inflexible property regimes
because the emphasis in most private property regimes is on
guaranteeing security of expectations. However, the existence
of strong private property rights may have positive
consequences for resilience. For example, most planning
regimes have developed sophisticated procedures that allow
for the mediation of private development concerns and public
interests. Also, the law of nuisance can be used to protect
property from the harmful actions of other property owners.
In some circumstances, private law actions can be used to
challenge or expedite public decisions concerning the use of
property (McGillivray and Wightman 1997). If successful, this
can provide a check on imperfect regulatory regimes; even if
unsuccessful, it can help to ensure debate, increase awareness
of issues, and put pressure on regulators (Bishop and Jenkins
2011). It thereby serves to ensure that decision-making is more
pluralistic, socially responsive, and knowledge driven. For
example, in Massachusetts vs. EPA (549 U.S. 497 [2007]), the
U.S. Supreme Court remanded a decision back to the
Environmental Protection Agency because it had failed
without reason to exercise its authority to establish measures
to control greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles
under the Clean Air Act. Here, a public nuisance action was
brought against a public body that was perceived to have failed
in its duty to regulate private property in a way that limited
certain harmful consequences. Of course, such judicial
intervention is not the usual device for deciding how property
should be regulated in complex systems, and the courts are
more often reluctant to interfere with duly constituted
administrative procedures for regulating property and
protecting the environment. Thus, in a more recent U.S.
Supreme Court case, American Electric Power vs. Connecticut 
(131 S.Ct. 2527 [2011]), it was held that a statutory regime
for emissions control had displaced a common law nuisance
action. The underlying rationale in this case appears to be that
if a complex regulatory matter has been entrusted to an
administrative body, then the courts should not interfere in
how this power is exercised. As the court stated in American
Electric Power, “Federal judges lack the scientific, economic,
and technological resources an agency can utilize in coping
with issues of this order.” This refrain from intervening in a
question of resource management indicates that there are limits
on how far judicial mechanisms can be used to deal with
complex social-ecological systems. 
As noted above, private property rights, and TEAs in
particular, have tended to apply to single components of social-
ecological systems, rather than the entire system. Thus, the
global atmosphere is a global commons and subject to
collective management by States. As such, no individual has
an “owner’s” interest in preventing harmful activities from
degrading the atmosphere. This suggests that there are
potential limits to the capacity of private property to facilitate
resilience in large-scale systems. There are both strong moral
grounds for retaining nonexclusive interests in systems such
as the atmosphere, and practical difficulties in designating a
single authority to control a resource that wraps the entire
world and the multitude of States and communities therein.
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Such practical limits tend to flow from structural limits
inherent in private property. Morally, it would be questionable
to vest exclusive control over fundamentally important things
to a single person or agency that could determine access and
use, and potentially deprive people of access to essential
goods. In practical terms, there are problems in securing
exclusive rights over a global system. 
The global atmosphere might be an extreme example of a
nonexcludable social-ecological system, but such practical
questions about the relevance and application of private
property remain at smaller scales; hence, the general absence
of ownership of marine resources or habitats. These limitations
flow from structural requirements inherent in private property.
First, private property rights generally need to be quite simple
because this facilitates both their security and tradability (Rose
2002). If the precise scope of the right is ill-defined or is subject
to considerable external regulation, then the value and function
of the right is reduced, and individuals cannot plan for the
future. Our understanding of the boundaries and nature of
complex large-scale systems is limited, and this makes it
difficult to even draw the boundaries of any potential private
property right. Second, private property needs to be supported
by a single legal system capable of defining, regulating, and
enforcing the right; for transboundary resources, this is not
possible under domestic law. Such concerns indicate that
private property may not be suitable for the regulation of large
systems as a whole. 
This is not to deny that private property rights can operate at
larger scales or apply to the components of large social-
ecological systems. One of the advantages of private property
is that transactions can readily take place between strangers
because property rules are usually quite simple and well-
understood (Merrill and Smith 2000). This means that private
property can operate at quite large scales, facilitating
transactions across State borders and forming part of a global
regulatory regime. Clearly, forms of private property do
operate at global scales, allowing international trade in
commodities, global stock markets, and TEAs in the form of
tradable emissions quotas and fishing quotas. However, such
rights relate to components of systems, rather than whole
systems. As such, they provide only part of a regulatory
response to resilience. Even then, private property may run
into difficulties because individual property transactions at
these scales can generate high transaction costs and
externalities. For highly complex social-ecological systems
with multiple ownership interests in individual components
of the system, the time and cost of negotiating a management
regime to account for system-wide concerns is likely to be
prohibitive. This is apparent if we look at the example of rights-
based fishing entitlements. These only pertain to the fish, and
not the wider marine ecosystem. Because such rights are
limited to specific species, this tends to increase the potential
difficulties arising from externalities such as by-catches,
discards, and adverse impacts of fishing techniques on the
marine environment. Ultimately, any fisheries management
regime using TEAs must still deal with externalities. In
practice, this is likely to require considerable regulatory
intervention or a profound restructuring of the individual
rights. This may then defeat the advantages of using private
property in the first place. 
Such problems are even more acute with respect to efforts to
manage biodiversity. Biodiversity is defined as the variability
within and between species and their ecosystems. As such, it
is a nonexclusive interest that transcends the individual
components of biodiversity (which may or may not be owned).
The conservation of biodiversity requires not merely limits on
the use of resources, but positive obligations to cooperate so
that knowledge of systems and their use is shared. However,
such cooperative requirements seem to comprise duties, and
this seems difficult to accommodate within a concept of private
property built around exclusive claim rights in specific
resources (Barnes 2010). It may be possible to accommodate
positive duties of cooperation into property holdings, but this
would seem to require appropriate incentives to holders of the
right to act in a particular way, or some restructuring of the
right to manage a thing, for example, by vesting part of this
in an external agency that can compel cooperation. However,
at this point, the nature of the holding has fundamentally
changed from private property to something else like
stewardship of collective property. 
Forms of private property can be varied to accommodate a
wide range of circumstances, thereby meeting the need for
flexibility in resilient systems. Because private property rights
are bundles of rights, they can, in theory, be divided and
allocated in many different ways. Thus, a proprietary interest
in farmland is defined quite differently to a proprietary interest
in an emissions permit. The former might have an open-ended
duration and include extensive rights of use and management,
whereas the latter may only last for a period of years and be
absent any management authority such as the right to decide
overall emissions levels or monitoring and reporting
requirements. Flexibility to adapt the form of holding, for
example, by leasing the property or sub-dividing it, is a highly
desirable attribute and shows how private property can be
creatively developed and flexible in its application. It also
indicates that property systems are inherently capable of
meeting a diverse range of scenarios, and so contribute to
optionality. Of course, whether or not individual forms of
property are designed or adapted to meet changing
circumstances will depend on the degree to which the owners
interests are aligned with the change and the effectiveness of
the institutional rules for property in securing change, either
through the voluntary acts of the owner or the imposition of
external constraints by the State. 
As noted above, an owner has an exclusive interest in capital
of his/her property. From a resilience perspective, a potentially
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negative side effect of this is that it may instill a desire to
strengthen the right because this will increase the value of the
holding. Thus, there is a tendency for private property regimes
to consolidate the quality of the holding by securing greater
control to the owner over rights to manage, use, and alienate
a thing, and to extend the duration of such rights and protect
against external interference, particularly from the State. If
this happens, the private property right may become resistant
to change because the State has less authority to interfere in a
private right or determine how it can be exercised. This tension
between secure private property rights and regulatory control
is a feature of the debate over the creation of TEAs in fisheries.
It is notable that the United States was extremely cautious
about designating property rights over fisheries precisely
because of the risk that constitutionally enshrined protections
against regulatory takings would render fisheries management
impossible or expensive (Barnes 2009). Such difficulties are
likely to be even more profound when the transformation of
a property regime is considered. Social resistance to the
restructuring of property rights was widespread in Iceland and
New Zealand when those countries introduced TEAs in
fisheries (Barnes 2009). This shows how private property
might result in engineered solutions, whereby certain social
(i.e., private property) interests become entrenched within a
legal system and are resistant to change. 
Owners of private property respond in different ways and
degrees to social and natural changes. Their potential
resistance to regulatory intervention aside, there is a general
consensus that property rights support social responsiveness.
In a system of private property, authority to make decisions is
highly decentralized, at least in the absence of a monopoly
control of a thing or market. In such cases, the monopoly
authority can strongly resist external regulation or market
forces to protect its own interests, and it is notable that most
legal systems have strong anti-monopoly laws to prevent such
occurrences. In normal circumstances, private property creates
the space for the exercise of choice and so frees owners to deal
with their property in light of changing social or economic
conditions. This is partially a function of the laws of supply
and demand, and partially a manifestation of the emphasis on
individual liberty in liberal societies. In theory, markets
provide an efficient and responsive means of transacting
(Farber 1994). Indeed, if the market is functioning properly,
it can provide a means of ensuring that changed social
conditions are met through changes to the allocation, structure,
and value of property rights. In turn, this may reinforce the
resilience of private property because it facilitates the pursuit
of owner’s goals. On the other hand, because private property
can inculcate habituated decision-making by establishing a
domain free from external influence, it may become
unresponsive. Rational people may be reluctant to change the
status quo, even when the benefits of change are known to
outweigh the costs (Rachlinski 2000). For example, we are all
culpable of putting lights on, letting taps run, or leaving the
air conditioning running, even if not necessary and even if we
know it may result in harm or waste. The point is not that
property generates particular habits of waste or harm, but
rather that the sphere of exclusive interest may limit external
stimuli that can provoke behavioral changes and adaptation.
Related to this is the difficulty of coordinating changes in
behavior in a decentralized system of authority. Localized
changes may happen organically, and changed behavior can
evolve over longer time frames. However, this seems ill-suited
to dealing with system-wide shocks or unforeseen changes
such as natural disasters. These may require more immediate
responses and generally depend upon regulatory intervention,
which again may be resisted. Unless interference is justified
and compensated, then we must be attuned to the potential
resistance to change inherent in private property (Michelman
1967). 
As a final point on the responsiveness of private property, there
is the unresolved issue of how to take into account the interests
of future generations when defining or regulating private
property. Social-ecological systems are dynamic, so any
resilience strategy (or transformation strategy) should account
for future interests. Under a system of private property, this is
not easily achieved because the decision-making authority is
vested in actors with a limited knowledge of and concern for
the circumstances of future generations. Intergenerational
issues generally require some external agency capable of
acting on behalf of future generations, and this is not generally
an internal feature of private property regimes. 
The extent to which private property rights facilitate and
harness knowledge is rather complicated. Because the owner
is normally guaranteed the fruits of any investment he/she
makes in the property, he/she is encouraged to enhance and
develop the resource. Thus, private property is seen to
stimulate creativity and investment, and this may serve to
generate knowledge about the property and enhance our
understanding of the wider social-ecological system. Private
property rights may be transacted in markets, and this
encourages the gathering, development, and use of
information because this information strengthens agents’
chances of transacting to a beneficial outcome. In a free
market, property transactions are undertaken on a voluntary
basis and will be negotiated to accommodate as far as possible
needs, interests, and expectations of both parties (Ellickson
1973). This process generates its own knowledge about
practices, expectations, and desires, and underpins the
operation of markets. However, at the same time, such
knowledge may have commercial value, and there is no
guarantee that knowledge about things will be disseminated.
Indeed, this limiting of access to knowledge is the whole point
about granting exclusive intellectual property rights over the
results of certain activities like pharmaceutical research. 
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Running through this review of private property and resilience
is the idea that private property interests are not always aligned
with resilience strategies. Positive alignment may arise
incidentally from the owner’s interest in the capital of the
resource. For example, a landowner facing a loss of productive
arable land due to desertification may be inclined to support
a range of measures designed to mitigate the impacts of global
warming or accept a proposed transformation of the land-use
scenario. However, the alignment of interests cannot be
assumed, and there will frequently be a conflict between
individual interests and collective goals designed to adapt to
changes in social-ecological systems. For example, adaptation
to climate change may require the closure of a facility that
contributes to the production of greenhouse gases or the
sacrifice of land threatened by coastal erosion. In such cases,
collective decisions will certainly be resisted by individual
property rights holders. This suggests that a key challenge for
management strategies based on private property is to align
the interests of individual owners with the requirements secure
social-ecological resilience.
Community-based holdings
Community-based holding (CBH) refers to a range of
decentralized management regimes used to govern common-
pool resources. My point is not to review and advocate such
forms, but to explore how some of the general attributes of
CBHs can accommodate social-ecological resilience. CBHs
have been adopted for a range of natural resources systems,
including fisheries, forests, pastures, and waterways (Ostrom
1990). There is a growing body of literature that shows the
long pedigree of such regimes, and they certainly predate many
modern private property-based regimes. As such, CBHs can
be regarded as a resilient, or at least persistent, form of social
organization. Because CBHs can operate on the basis of
informal customs and practices, they may exist outside usual
domestic property regimes. Indeed, the fact that such regimes
do not necessarily require formal legal support suggests that
they may be more resilient than private property, which is
contingent on strong institutional support. However, although
there is evidence of CBHs that have existed for hundreds of
years without formal support by the State, in the longer term,
some formal recognition of a CBH is likely to ensure its
continuity (Berkes 1996). Some students of property might
take the view that, ultimately, CBHs will be reduced to private
or public property regimes as resource use intensifies and the
externalities of common property begin to outgrow those
associated with operating a system of private property.
Notably, New Zealand kills two birds with one stone by using
a system of private property-based fishing rights to remove
inefficiency from marine commercial fisheries and capture
indigenous fishing rights (Barnes 2009). However, recent
regulatory developments in the field of environmental law
appear to be challenging the apparent decline of CBH. A key
feature of CBH is the community involvement in decision-
making. Arguably, public law requirements of participatory
decision-making are reinvesting the regulation of land and
other natural resources with a strong community element
(Holder 2004). Although this might not challenge the
fundament status of a thing as private property, by affording
interested or affected persons with the right to be involved in
decisions concerning the use of property, a degree of
community-based management is re-engaged. 
There is evidence that the effectiveness of CBHs is threatened
when external circumstances generate pressure from
nonmembers to alter the regime (Rose 2002). This can result
from political changes such as those that occurred during the
colonization of land by European States, or changes in
environmental conditions such as famine or flood. This
indicates that although CBHs can rely on internal management
strategies to regulate resources, members of the defined user
group still depend on external exclusion for the regime to work
(Berkes 1996). As such, there are some similarities with
private property-based regimes. Indeed, ultimately, exclusion
of nonmembers of a community may require the same level
and kind of formal support that private property rights require. 
In principle, CBHs are as flexible as private property. Thus,
CBHs range from the simple set of rules a village has
developed to control grazing on common land to the far more
complex arrangements based on kinship, locality, seasonal
variations, and changing weather patterns that characterize
some artisanal fisheries (Wilson et al. 1994). As in the case of
private property, CBH can be structured to suit a wide range
of social and natural circumstances and so is a potentially
flexible management tool. However, this only describes the
variety achieved through having a range of CBHs. It does not
relate to the internal flexibility of individual CBHs. The latter
will very much depend on the design of the individual CBH. 
A key feature of CBH is that it can be supported by both legal
and extra-legal norms. The latter can be illustrated by India’s
formalization of a system of community-based ownership of
forests by way of legislation, i.e., the Scheduled Tribes and
other Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006, 
which was designed to secure pre-existing but disparate rights
associated with ownership of forest land and resources. At the
level of international law, fisheries within the remit of a
Regional Fisheries Management Organization are effectively
a form of common property, even if international law does not
designate this status to such fish stocks. Informal CBH can be
illustrated by reference to numerous small-scale fisheries. For
example, Acheson (2003) has done much to elevate the
informal control of lobster fishing in Maine. Elsewhere,
Bernstein (1992) has shown how community-based arbitration
(in place of formal State based law) has helped the sustain
diamond industry. Although not strictly a form of community
property, the latter study indicates how informal community
institutions can flourish, even in market-based contexts. 
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This flexibility in the constitution of CBH means that it may
be responsive to a wider range of values than are purely
captured within a legal system. Indeed, CBHs are usually
contingent upon adherence to norms, including trust,
reputation, reciprocity, community pressure, and the pull of
collective values. This may mean that CBHs can be socially
responsive because, at least initially, they need to align
resource use rules with a broader range of community needs.
Of course, this also means that such regimes are most effective
when the community values and processes are well defined
and well settled. However, if a community lacks inclusive
decision-making processes, then there is a risk that the CBHs
can undermine wider social needs. Rose (2002) suggests that
CBHs tend to become less socially responsive than private
property regimes after they are fully established. This is
because the complexities of the governance mechanisms that
evolve over time are difficult to deconstruct. Also, ties of
kinship or other social practices may render it difficult to leave
or enter a regime and may preclude external social values from
shaping the use of the property. This may be positive if it helps
resist destructive consumptive demands such as consumerism,
but it can equally result in the ossification of poor management
practices. 
It appears that CBHs may be more responsive to shifts in the
natural environment than are property rights. CBHs often
develop from customs and practices that reflect natural
resource patterns such as the abundance of resources in
particular places or at particular times. As the CBH develops,
it adapts to identifiable patterns in the resource system, and
this influences social practices. For example, rights to use
water for irrigation in a CBH will be determined according to
seasonal water levels (Ostrom 1990). This adaption is possible
because individual entitlements are not as fixed as for typical
private property rights. Moreover, decisions on use are taken
in light of community needs, and these tend to prioritize the
sustainability of the resource base. 
The existence of a community is crucial to CBHs because this
provides the structure for and values that define the
management of the relevant resource. This has implications
for the capacity of CBHs to operate at larger scales. Well-
defined and structured communities tend to exist at local
levels, where there are frequent interactions between users and
opportunities to develop community values and practices.
Accordingly, most CBHs operate at small scales (Rose 2002).
Thus, fishing communities may be based around fishing towns
and provide a basis for regulating local fisheries (McCay
2011). Here, I note that CBHs are less well suited to
international resource regimes simply because the community
structures and values are poorly developed at this scale.
International law recognizes a number of international
commons such as the high seas, deep seabed, Antarctic, and
outer space, and such areas are regulated in a nonexclusive
fashion, similar to CBHs. However, the absence of strong
shared values and interactions between the heterogeneous
groups of States comprising the international community has
resulted in either weak or basic management regimes for these
areas (Barnes 2010). Ostrom (1990) has suggested that CBHs
can become nested and so operate at a larger scale. However,
such coordination tends to require some degree of extra-
community-based support, usually though governmental
institutions. So even if social-ecological systems are identified
for coordination of CBH at the transnational level, the same
structural problems inherent in the international legal system
undermine the coordination or use of CBHs. 
Finally, we can observe how CBH might facilitate knowledge.
Because CBHs are community based, they naturally include
a wider range of participants in the management process.
Multiple stakeholders will be able to feed their experience into
the management regime. It may be noted that McCay (2011),
in the context of fisheries management, refers to epistemic
communities based around expertise and shared concerns and
values. Furthermore, the closed nature of the community-
based model will require participants to develop their practices
mutually, rather than seek external solutions. These factors
may enhance the role of knowledge within the system.
CONCLUSION
Social-ecological resilience has become a relatively well-
understood concept, and it is increasingly used to influence
the design of resource management regimes. As such, it will
increasingly affect the design and operation of property rights
over natural resources. Because property rights are sustained
through legal rules and systems, property is necessarily
infused with the broader values underpinning the legal system.
Most legal systems have developed property rights according
to long-established notions of desert, liberty, utility, and
propriety, but they also require that property systems fit with
the objects of property. This and the value inclusiveness of
legal regimes suggest that there is plenty of scope to
accommodate resilience within property institutions.
However, the relative nature and contingency of resilience
means that it will only be one among several values that
influence the design and operation of property regimes. There
seems little reason to doubt that property rights can
accommodate social-ecological resilience. The defeasible and
dynamic nature of law lends itself particularly to adaption.
There is also a high degree of flexibility within domestic
property systems, and, in principle, the great variety of
property rights and their contextual application maintains the
options necessary for resilience. Of course, particular
configurations of property may be more of less suited to the
regulation of particular resources or resource systems. The
wide range and variability of both TEAs and CBHs makes it
impossible to generalize about which form of holding is better
suited to accommodating social-ecological resilience. Indeed,
it may be that resource regimes require a combination of both;
hence, legislation should be adopted that establishes forms of
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property or property management that capture elements of
private property and CBHs. Complex combinations of private
and community property can coexist in the same resource
regime (Smith 2000). Ultimately, as Fennel (2011) notes, the
issue comes down to a question of how best to accommodate
multiple uses of things at different scale or different times.
This perhaps accounts for the way in which property in the
same resource evolves through different forms over time, and
requires us to be flexible in our choice of property instruments. 
Although the operation of property is more complex than this
somewhat binary presentation of private property and CBH
might suggest, some general observations can be still be
offered on the capacity of different forms of property to
accommodate social-ecological resilience. Private property is
an enduring institution, capable of operating at large scales
through market-based economies. Markets generally mean
that private property is socially responsive, although it is
important to appreciate that there are occasions when it can
be very resistant to change. It is best suited to narrowly drawn
resources, rather than large complex resource systems, and it
encourages protection of and investment in resources. In
contrast, CBHs may be better suited to complex resource
regimes at local levels. Although less socially adaptive, they
may be better suited to changes in ecological systems because
of their greater sensitivity to the natural constraints on resource
use. The capacity of either type of property will depend on the
precise arrangement of resource use rules. As such, much more
research into the practice of various property regimes and their
impacts on social-ecological systems is required if we are to
understand how well suited TEAs and CBHs are to
accommodate social-ecological resilience.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/5292
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